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In Phaedo 74b6-c6 Plato offers an important argument for the proposition 
that such things as “ the equal itself,” i.e. such things as are often called 
“ Forms,” are distinct from sensible objects. The argument is especially 
important because it is one of a very small number of explicit arguments— 
perhaps only two—that Plato gives for this proposition.1
I wish to isolate this argument to concentrate on what I take to be its 
philosophically most interesting features as an argument for the existence 
of Forms distinct from sensibles. I am not here concerned with its other 
interesting features, such as its role in Plato’s argument for the kind of a 
priori knowledge that he calls “ recollection.”
I am especially interested in what must be presupposed if the argument 
is to be thought cogent (though I certainly do not believe that it is in fact 
cogent), and what is likely to have been presupposed by Plato. I am also 
concerned to show just how narrow a basis Plato wishes to use for the 
argument. In particular, I would like to make it clear how little of his view 
about Forms is presupposed in the argument, and how little of that view 
one can infer simply from interpreting the argument itself, as contrasted 
with the surrounding context.
1. In 74a9-12, Plato writes as follows (translations are my own):
We say that there is some equal,—I don’t mean a log to a log or a 
stone to a stone or anything else of that sort—but something else 
different from all those, the equal itself. Shall we say it is something 
or nothing?
Plato’s interlocutor, Simmias, agrees emphatically and without argument. His 
agreement is not surprising, in view of the fact that earlier at 65d4-e5
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it has been said, with just as little controversy, “ We say that there is 
something, [the] just itself,” as well as “ [the] beautiful [itself], [the] good 
[itself], size, health, strength, and the being of all of the others, what each 
is,” and it has also been said that people have “ not seen any such things 
with [their] eyes.”
On the basis of these passages it is often thought that Plato is taking his 
theory of Forms for granted.2 Some scholars used to infer even that a belief 
in Forms was held by the historical Socrates and indeed went back to the 
Pythagoreans, but that view is rarely enough held nowadays that I propose 
to pass over it. Others wonder whether Plato can perhaps have thought 
that the existence of Forms needed no argument at all to the ordinary 
person or the ordinary philosopher, though other Platonic passages, such 
as Republic 476-480 and Sophist 246a-b show that that is not the case. 
Another possibility is that he knew that the matter was controversial, but 
simply never had a cogent argument to give, perhaps believing either 
(though it is not at all clear that he would ever endorse such a form of 
inference) that belief in the existence of Forms could be justified indirectly, 
by some overall fruitfulness or reasonableness of the conclusions issuing 
from it,3 or (something that he sometimes seems to suggest) that people 
to whom the existence of Forms is not obvious are too obtuse to be worth 
bothering with.
It is important, however, to be clearly aware of just what he is taking 
for granted, and what he is prepared to try to justify. He does take for 
granted that there is such a thing as “ the equal itself,”  “ the beautiful 
itself,” and so on. He does not, however, take for granted that such things 
are distinct from  sensible, physical objects, although he does state this 
claim before he actually argues for it. He states it in 65d-e, where it is 
agreed that one has “ never seen with one’s eyes” or “ touched with any 
other of the bodily senses” any such things as “ the beautiful itself” (65d9- 
12). It is also stated in 74a9-12 that “ we say” that there is some equal 
that is not “ a log to a log or a stone to a stone or anything else of that 
sort, but something else different from all those.” But in 74b6-c6 Plato 
explicitly addresses the possibility that someone may not agree that Forms 
are distinct from sensible objects, and provides an argument to try to meet 
this view. “ Or do they not appear different to you?” he says, and proceeds 
to argue that they are.
But before we take up this argument, let us ask what, after all, the claim 
Plato has taken for granted amounts to, if not that Forms are distinct from 
sensibles. Clearly, that there is such a thing as “ the equal,” “ the
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beautiful,” and so on. However, this can easily seem in itself to be a 
relatively uncontroversial claim, when divorced from the further claim that 
these things are distinct from sensibles. “ Is there such a thing as equality?” 
Plato probably expected interlocutors to respond affirmatively without hes­
itation, so long as the response was deemed compatible with denying that 
there exist any objects beside sensible ones, and with saying that equality 
is in fact a sensible object itself. “ Certainly there is such a thing as 
equality,” he might expect them to say, “ but it isn’t something distinct 
from sensible equal things, and perhaps it isn’t any single thing (cf. Rep. 
479a4-5, e.g.); rather, it is just different sensible equals, depending on the 
context of discourse, or else it is somehow all of them taken together.”
To this way of dispensing with Forms and the like there is of course a 
well-known alternative, exploited by Russell in another connection, of 
saying that all contexts of discourse containing explicit talk of “ equality,” 
as purporting to refer to an object, ought to be regarded as a misleading 
manner of speaking, to be paraphrased en bloc into discourse not containing 
any expression seeming to designate such an entity. But although I think 
Plato could have constructed an argument against this alternative, he does 
not seem to me at all likely to have had it in mind, or expected his opponents 
to. For this reason, I think that he in no way intends here to be taking any 
controversial metaphysical claim for granted. Instead, as he and his op­
ponents view the matter, the really controversial and substantive part of 
what he has to say here comes when he argues, in 74b6-c6, that the equal 
is distinct from sensible equal things.
2. That argument is in one way less interesting than it has sometimes been
taken to be, but philosophically I think it is more interesting than is usually 
realized. It is less interesting because it gives us rather less information 
than we might have hoped to gain from it concerning Plato’s views about 
Forms, or what I shall speak of, with many others, as his theory of Forms.4 
The argument rests on a claim that Forms have a certain feature that 
sensibles do not have, and therefore must be distinct from sensibles. The 
question is, what exactly is that feature. If it is important for delineating 
Plato’s theory, then the argument may tell us something interesting about 
it.
Unfortunately, what the property is lies obscured in some exegetical 
problems, which we shall have to examine briefly. The passage, 74b6-c6, 
runs as follows:
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. . .  Or doesn’t it [the equal itself] appear (4>aCveTou) to you 
different [.sc., from sensible sticks and stones]? Consider thus. Don’t 
equal ( loth) sticks and stones sometimes, being the same (Tcarrd 
’ovTa), appear (cjxxCveToa) to one person equal and not to another?
Certainly.
Well, then, have the equals themselves (cdna to  ’Ccta) ever 
appeared (ecjxivTi) to you unequal (aviua), or equality (Ict6tt]s) 
inequality (&vlctott|s)?
Never yet, Socrates.
So these equals (Tavra to  ’Cera) and the equal itself (cdno to 
I(tov) are not the same.
They don’t appear (4>aCveTai) so to me at all.
On this translation of the passage, Plato seems to think that there is a 
difference between Forms and sensibles with regard to how it is possible 
for them to appear to us, and so we shall have to see what that difference 
is.
3. But the translation is controversial in one way that would conflict with 
this understanding of the argument.5 For under a suggestion made by 
N. R. Murphy and developed by G. E. L. Owen, the passage should be 
taken to mean that “ equal sticks and stones sometimes, being the same, 
appear equal to one thing and not to another.” 6
Although there is something to be said for this interpretation,7 it seems 
to me now that it cannot be sustained as a reading of the present passage. 
Three points against it are noted by David Gallop.8 One is that since any 
equal thing is inevitably equal to some things and not to others, it would 
seem very strange to say only that this happens “ sometimes” (b8). Second, 
the interpretation makes Plato hold that the equal itself somehow is free 
from this feature of sensible equals, which appears to make little sense, 
since it involves supposing that the equal itself is somehow equal but not 
equal to anything.9 Third, it is awkward, verbally at least, to apply the 
argument framed in terms of “ equal” , to the other terms (“ beautiful’ , 
etc.) that Plato gives in 75c-d (as well as, one should add, 65d-e).
A fourth objection to the Murphy/Owen interpretation is that it makes 
little sense of Plato’s repeated use of the word “ appears” (<t>o:Cvecr0aO- 
If Plato’s point were that equal sensible objects are equal to one thing but 
not to another, then he might be expected to have said just that.10 It might 
be replied that <f>oaveCT0oa need not mean “ appears” but can also mean
200
“ is evidently or apparently” . But this reading of the word fits awkwardly 
onto the present passage. The only contrast that is natural to see in 74b8, 
in the phrase “ being (’ovtch) the same,” is a contrast between how things 
are and how they appear, not one between how things are and how they 
evidently are. Moreover, when the conclusion is reached in c4-5, an em­
phatic “ is” (e<TTiv) is used (which contrasts naturally with <t>ouveTai in 
b7, which deals with how things seemed before the argument was given).11
Of the objections that Gallop lists, the third seems relatively weak,12 
but the other two are weighty, as is the fourth objection just expounded. 
The first strengthens the observation just made about what the natural 
contrast is to see in the passage. The second would require an essay in 
itself to deal with, but seems to me extremely strong. Although Plato has 
been accused by philosophers since Russell of being confused about re­
lations and relational predicates, it seems to me to require far more than 
such a philosophical confusion to explain how Plato could have thought, 
straightforwardly and consciously, that anything, sensible or not, could be 
equal but not equal to anything, or equal to some one thing but not unequal 
to other things that are themselves equal to that first thing.13 Moreover 
there is strong evidence, from such passages as Symp. 199dsqq., that Plato 
did indeed understand that relational predicates in general, or at least binary 
relational predicates, do not hold just of isolated single objects without 
regard to others, as nonrelational predicates do.14 At any rate, the present 
case, “ equal” does not seem to me to be one about which he could have 
been so ludicrously confused.15
4. So let us take our translation as provisionally given and try to understand 
its implications.
Remember that even though Plato is talking to people who, as we saw 
from 65d-e and 74a, are willing to accept the view that the equal itself is 
distinct from all sensible objects, he is in 74b6-c6 temporarily arguing 
against doubts about that thesis. For that reason, we may expect that his 
argument will use premises that will be plausible to those not accepting 
the thesis or special theses associated with it.
Let us look at those premises. I shall first expound them briefly, under 
what I take to be the natural and correct interpretation, and explain how 
they are supposed to yield the conclusion that Plato wishes. Then I shall 
take up a number of difficulties that have led commentators to interpret 
them otherwise.
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Premise (A): Don’t equal sticks and stones sometimes, being the same, 
appear to one person equal and not to another? What phenomenon is 
Plato alluding to here? The initially most natural interpretation, which is 
also supported by reasons that I shall be laying out, is that he is alluding, 
as W. D. Ross and R. Hackforth suggested,16 to the familiar fact that any 
pair of visible objects, which are in fact equal, can appear equal to a person 
looking at them from one perspective, but appear unequal to a person 
simultaneously looking at them from another perspective. (“ Sometimes,” 
because of course at other times a pair of equal objects may well seem 
equal to all observers who are looking at them.) There have been objections 
to this interpretation, but I shall deal with them in due course.
Premise (B): Well, then, have the equals themselves (airrdna ’Caa) ever 
appeared (e4>avT]) to you unequal (’av iaa ), or equality (IcroT'qs) 
inequality (o^vuxott^s)?—Never yet, Socrates. What is being alluded to 
here is something much more complicated and problematical, though at 
first sight it may well seem to be the straightforward fact that Plato presents 
it as being. If one considers the question that one might formulate by 
asking whether equality could ever appear to one to be inequality, it seems 
very easy to reply that it obviously could not. For it seems hard to imagine, 
in any straightforward way, a circumstance in which one could say that 
equality appears to be inequality, or in which one thinks that equality is 
inequality.17
These two premises together are designed to demonstrate that the equal 
itself must be distinct from any sensible equal object or objects by showing 
that a certain feature possessed by the former is not possessed by the 
latter.18 This feature is, to speak loosely, a kind of incapacity to be the 
subject of a certain sort of error or perhaps misapprehension. The crucial 
question is, exactly what is this resistance to error? As commentators have 
observed, this question is quite difficult.19
The main difficulty with the argument, as construed in this way, is that 
of finding one and the same sort of resistance to error that can reasonably 
be attributed to Forms but withheld from sensibles. It seems somewhat 
plausible to say that equality never appears to be inequality, but it seems 
doubtful that any equal objects ever appear to be inequality either. Simi­
larly, it seems plausible, as we saw, to say that sensible equals sometimes 
appear unequal, but it sounds very strange to say that equality never appears 
unequal, since that makes it sound as though equality is some sort of object 
with dimensions that can be measured against others by the mind s eye. 
Equally, as David Bostock points out, it does not seem possible for Plato
202
to argue that whereas equality can never appear to be its contrary, sensible 
equals can appear to be “ their contrary,” since two different senses of 
“ contrary” would be involved here, one for a property (or the like) that 
is contrary to another property, and another for a thing possessing the 
contrary property to that possessed by another thing.20 So what is it that, 
according to Plato, is true of the equal but not of sensible equals?
It seems to me that this problem is solved once one correctly interprets 
the way Plato understands the supposition being argued against, that the 
equal itself might be sensible. Sensible equals, we agree, are capable of 
appearing unequal to people looking at them. Now if it is to be supposed 
that the equal itself might be a sensible equal thing or pair of sensible 
equal things, clearly it would have, to be supposed also that the unequal, 
or alternatively inequality, was also a sensible object. For plainly the idea 
that motivates the supposition about the equal is that there are no objects 
other than sensibles, and there is no question that here— whatever may be 
the case elsewhere in Plato’s works— Plato claims existence as much for 
the unequal as for the equal.21 So if the equal were sensible, and if 
accordingly the unequal were also sensible, then since any sensible equal 
is capable of appearing unequal, it would turn out that the equal was capable 
of appearing, in respect of equality or inequality, just like the unequal and 
in the relevant way indistinguishable from it.22 So the feature that equality 
possesses and that it would not possess if it were sensible is that of being 
incapable of appearing, from any point of view, indistinguishable from 
inequality.
To this perspectivalist line of interpretation Alexander Nehamas has 
raised an objection, that it does not allow the generalization of Plato’s 
argument from “ equal” to other predicates.23 According to Nehamas, 
although Plato might conceivably hold that a given type of action, for 
example, would always have both just and unjust instances (see, e.g ., 
Rep. 331c-d), he would never say that numerically one and the same 
particular action either (a) is both just and unjust or, given the circum­
stances in which it actually occurs, even (b) appears both just and unjust 
from different perspectives. As to (a), Nehamas is of course quite right, 
though it is not relevant to the present issue. But not about (b), which is. 
Plato agrees here that the sticks are equal (see iom , “ equal,” in b8, and 
n. 10). What he claims, on the perspectivalist interpretation, is that they 
appear unequal from different perspectives. Nehamas disputes this for other 
cases, such as “just” . But it seems to me that on examination the case 
fails to hold up. The perspectives that Nehamas thinks are lacking in such
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cases are provided precisely by the sources of that very disagreement among 
people—their own interests and mistaken or confused views about what 
justice is—that Plato thinks is rampant. From the viewpoint of the madman 
in Republic 331c-d, who knows that he has been promised a weapon and 
who believes that it is just to return what one owes, it will appear just for 
the weapon to be returned, even though in what Plato takes to be the correct 
view it is not just. He never suggests that viewpoints are lacking from 
which such correct judgments will appear false, or from which incorrect 
judgments will appear true. What makes it possible for us sometimes to 
adjudicate such cases correctly, he holds, is the use of calculation and 
measurement (cf. Euthyphro 7b-d), and also a knowledge of the Forms 
(e.g., Rep. 540a-b). But as the very example in the present argument 
shows, even when measurement shows that two things are equal it is 
possible for them to appear otherwise. So the perspectivalist interpretation 
seems to me to generalize quite as well as Plato could hope.
5. But even if this interpretation is conceded to be initially plausible, it 
faces some severe difficulties concerning Premise (B) that need to be 
confronted.
The first matter that needs to be disposed of concerns 74c 1-2, where 
Plato asks, “ Well, then, have the equals themselves (airra to ’Cca) ever 
appeared (e<f)&vT|) to you unequal (dviaa), or equality (1<tott|<;) inequality 
(dvuxo-rris)?” And why does he use both the plural expression, ‘ ‘the equals 
themselves” , and the singular, “ the equal itself” ? Do these expressions 
refer to different things or is Plato pleonastically raising one issue about 
one thing? Now in spite of some dissenting opinions, it seems to me 
impossible to make his argument hang together if we take him to be making 
distinct claims about distinct entities, since obviously c4-5 announces only 
one conclusion about one thing, “the equal itself. ” 24 Given that, we are 
obliged to say that in cl-4 he is using all three expressions, “the equals 
themselves” , “equality” , and “ the equal itself” , as different designations 
of the same item.
Let us first ask, then, why Plato uses the plural form, “the equals 
themselves” , instead of the more common singular expression, “the equal 
itself” , at c l -2? Here it seems to me that Owen had a reasonable initial 
answer: the plural form is a grammatically natural way of following up 
on the plural forms in the preceding lines (b7-9).25 This answer is sufficient 
to dispose of any grammatical oddity in the shift of terminology. But it
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leaves unanswered the further question whether there is any significance 
for Plato in the distinction between the singular, “ the equal itself” , and 
the plural, “the equals themselves” , as designations of the Form, and, if 
so, what that significance is. Here it seems to me that the right response, 
insofar as our argument is concerned, is that there plainly is no significance 
at all, and that is why Plato moves so casually between the two expressions. 
Further issues within the theory of Forms might indeed require Plato to 
determine which expression, if either, is the more apt, and we are free to 
search other texts for more evidence on the question. But the present 
argument requires no such determination, and it seems to me a mistake to 
read one in.
The next question receives an answer similar to the previous one. If we 
assume that there is no significant difference between the designations “the 
equal itself” and “the equals themselves” , we must then ask whether 
there is any significant difference between the phrases “ the equal itself” 
and “equality” in Plato’s formulation of Premise (B). (As Gallop points 
out,26 both are of the sort that Plato frequently uses as variant designations 
of Forms.) Once again, it seems to me that there cannot be, because Plato 
clearly presents the argument as yielding a single conclusion concerning 
a single sort of object (c4-5 with b2, 4-6).
But what is the explanation of Plato’s having used these two expressions? 
For they carry quite different suggestions. Notoriously, the phrase “ the 
equal itself” suggests what Gregory Vlastos once called “ self-predica­
tion,” the idea that the Form of equal is itself equal, i.e., some sort of 
equal thing (or, perhaps, equal things), whereas the term “ equality” seems 
to convey no such idea. Must we not understand the argument in one of 
these ways or the other?
Once again, the reasonable thing to say is that Plato does not settle this 
issue here, and casually allows both designations of the Form of equal, 
precisely because his argument here does not require that the issue be 
settled. The crucial thing for his argument is that the Form never appears 
to be its contrary, which it would do if it were a sensible object, as explained 
above at the end of sec. 4. Plato allows us to put this point in two different 
ways. One, which seems perhaps the less problematical, is to say that 
equality never appears to be inequality. The other is to say that the equal 
never appears to be unequal, which is to say that the Form never appears 
to have the distinguishing characteristic of its contrary (cf. n. 22). 1 see 
little doubt that Plato was in a position to ask himself which formulation 
was theoretically the more apt, and that he neatly sidestepped the question
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here because it seemed to him to have no bearing on this argument for the 
distinctness of Forms from sensibles.27
For this reason there seems no justification for reading the argument as 
if it requires for its cogency a “ self-predicationist” picture of the Forms. 
Some commentators assume that it must, probably because they read it in 
the light of the ensuing passage, 74c7-75a4, in which Plato says that 
sensibles “ fall short of” being just like Forms (74d5-7 with el-2, 75al-
2, bl-2, 7-8). I myself think that it is very unclear whether that passage 
forces a self-predicationist account of the Forms,28 but even if it does, that 
by no means entails that the present argument requires a premise either 
entailing or presupposing self-predication.
6. But even if we keep the argument unencumbered by special meta­
physical assumptions, we still must ask what it means to say that equality 
never appears to be inequality.
A first possibility is this. By analogy to the case of the equal things that 
can appear unequal from some viewpoints, one might think of the equal 
itself as something that one is somehow “ aware” of or with which one 
is “ acquainted.” And one might hold that one can never be aware of it 
in such a way as to make one believe that it is, while it is so presenting 
itself, inequality.
On a second view, one might take it that what is being said is solely 
that a certain proposition, that equality is inequality, is one that we are 
not capable of believing, or differently that a certain sentence, “Equality 
is inequality” , is not one that we are capable of sincerely asserting. On 
this view, the notion of a relation between the object, equality, and the 
person or mind in question, would be eliminated.
Now it is clear, on the one hand, that there is no justification in the 
passage for saying that Plato’s argument itself requires any substantial 
notion of awareness of equality by the mind. True, Plato often talks else­
where in such a way as to suggest such a notion,29 but even if he might 
accept it in the Phaedo  too, he does not indicate at all that the argument 
in 74b6-c6 must make use of it. And although Premise (A) deals with the 
way in which one can be aware, through sensation, of equal physical 
objects, that by no means implies that Premise (B) does something anal­
ogous for the equal itself.
On the other hand, the second view as stated obviously will not serve 
the purposes of the argument in 74b6-c6. As we have seen, that argument
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must proceed by citing a feature o f the object, equality, which is shown 
not to attach to equal sensibles. So no property of a sentence or proposition 
will serve Plato’s purposes unless it somehow implicates a feature of 
equality itself.
Now there is a way of introducing a feature of equality into this dis­
cussion of appearances without at the same time injecting a notion of 
awareness. This can be done through something like the notion of what 
has been called “belief de r e .” m The sentence, “ Plato believes that the 
equal is a Form” , need not be taken simply as saying that Plato stands in 
a certain relation to a particular proposition without involving a relation 
to the object, the equal. It can also be taken as ascribing to the equal a 
certain relation to Plato, namely, that of being believed by Plato to be a 
Form. In the same way, one can ascribe or deny to the equal another 
feature, that of being believed by Simmias to be the unequal. Now Plato 
does not here use the word “ believe” but uses instead the word “ appear” . 
But it seems entirely possible that he has in mind, under the expression 
“ (does not) appear to be the unequal” , a feature that might be expressed 
equally by the phrase, “ is (not) believed to be the unequal” . If that is so, 
then he would be saying that the equal does not have the feature of being 
believed by anyone to be the unequal.
The difficulty with this proposal, however, is that it seems to make 
Premise (B) turn out to be obviously false. For even if it is true that no 
one would ever hold a belief that he represented to himself by the sentence, 
“The equal is the unequal” , it is well known that there are other propo­
sitions, that arguably produce the same effect. For the equal can be referred 
to in other ways than by “ the equal” , e.g., “ the Form referred to at 
Phaedo 74c5” , and there seems no impossibility in someone’s believing 
something expressed by the (false) proposition, “The Form referred to at 
Phaedo 74c5 is the unequal” . But Plato’s premise will be falsified if this 
fact licenses us to infer that the equal has the feature, being believed to 
be the unequal.31 If (B) is to be plausible, examples of this sort have to 
be ruled out as expressing features of the equal. The question is whether 
Plato would have had any way of doing this.
I Obviously what the argument needs is a denial that any and all ways of 
designating an object can generate beliefs implicating a feature of the object 
of the relevant sort, which as we have seen are features having to do with 
how things “appear” (4>oavecr9oii). For example, Plato must be able to 
deny that when someone believes falsely that—in these words— “ the Form 
referred to at Phaedo 74c5 is inequality,” that shows that equality has
207
“appeared” to him to be inequality. To put the matter in a loose and 
slightly cumbersome way, Plato must be able to hold the thesis,
(D) Not all designations of an object (or other ways of thinking 
about an object32) that can be used to refer to that object in the 
formulation of a belief concerning it generate “appearances” 
of the object.
If this thesis can be sustained, then it may perhaps turn out that Premise 
(B) can be sustained as well. That is, it may turn out that there are no 
designations of equality under which anyone could hold an appearance- 
belief, as we may call it, to the effect that equality is inequality.
Plato himself in this passage uses an expression that may convey the 
necessary idea. The verb (evvoeiv), often translated “ to have in mind” 
or “consider” , occurs a number of times in a way allowing one to say 
that one has a particular object in mind (74b6, d l, e2, 75a5-6).33 Perhaps 
we can say, as a rough approximation, that in Plato’s view, someone’s 
using the expression “ the Form referred to at Phaedo 74c5” in a normal 
way would not eo ipso show that he “ had equality in mind,” whereas 
someone’s using the expression “ equality” in the normal way would show 
that he had equality in mind.
I have no idea how this distinction can be generally drawn in a clear 
and philosophically satisfactory way, but I think that from a naive point 
of view there does seem  to be a distinction between designations that, 
properly used or possessed, implicate a person’s having the designatum in 
mind and those that do not. Typically, people using the word “equality” 
can reasonably be said to have equality “ in mind,” and people using the 
phrase “ the Form referred to at . . .” cannot (though by now the reader 
of the foregoing probably does). So if Plato is using such a distinction, 
he is using something that at least has some appeal.
Moreover it seems plain, as I have indicated, that—and this is a point 
to be emphasized— Plato’s argument must presuppose some such distinction 
as this, in order to meet the obvious counterexamples to Premise (B), 
whether or not the distinction was clearly or explicitly in his mind, and 
whether or not he had any fixed way of explaining it. As I have already 
said, the distinction does not require him to hold that one can be “ aware 
of Forms in any full-blooded sense, though of course he might elsewhere 
have wished to use that notion (and I think he did). But it does require 
some notion of “ having in mind” that will exclude the sort of counter­
examples mentioned.
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7. Let us'briefly consider what lends Premise (B) the initial plausibility 
it seems to have.
The vague sense that one has about such abstract entities as equality is 
that any grasp of them must consist solely or almost solely in a grasp of 
their “ logical” relations to other such objects and their roles in various 
necessary-seeming “conceptual” facts. That is indeed why such objects 
have sometimes been held to be nothing but “ logical constructions,” not 
genuine entities at all. But if one sticks to a realistic view of the objects 
and takes this feeling seriously, one gets a picture of objects whose nature 
consists in, and can be grasped only through a grasp of, certain “ logical 
laws,” possibly some “ mathematical laws,” and various other “ concep­
tual truths.” It is seen as part of thinking about equality that one simply 
cannot somehow take it to be the same as those other objects from which 
it is distinguished by a crucial difference of “ conceptual role.”
It is surely this sense that leads to the feeling that there is no way both 
to have equality in mind and nevertheless to take it to be inequality. If 
equality is for present purposes understood to be sameness of some spatial 
dimension, then inequality seems to amount to nothing but lack of sameness 
of that spatial dimension. Thus, equality and inequality seem to stand to 
each other as merely the possession and the lack, by things within the 
same domain, of one and the same feature. A person to whom equality 
appears to be inequality seems accordingly like a person who is not capable 
of realizing that the having of a certain feature and the lacking of it are 
distinct. And such a person might well seem to be someone who is incapable 
of having equality, or inequality, in mind.
In the Theaetetus, as is well known, Plato tries to fend off some 
argumentation for a much stronger thesis, that it is impossible to have in 
mind any object of the sort “ that one can only think about” and never­
theless believe that it is any other such object (see 188a-d and 189c-2Q0c, 
and esp. 195e-196a).34 That thesis is stronger than our Premise (B) in at 
least two ways. For one thing, it deals not merely with the relation between 
a property and its contrary, but with a relation between an object that can 
be thought about and all other such objects. Secondly, it says not merely 
that an object of the relevant sort cannot “appear” to be a different object, 
but that it is impossible to believe that the one object is another. What the 
considerations are that motivate that thesis, and what Plato thinks he can 
do to combat it (his attempt in the Theaetetus to rebut it is a self-confessed 
failure), are things that I cannot explore here. My only point is to emphasize 
that the claim that he makes in the Phaedo , though perhaps related to that
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thesis, is much weaker. It is also more plausible. As we have seen, some 
plausibility can be generated for the claim that it is impossible to have 
equality in mind and nevertheless have it appear to be inequality. It is far 
more difficult to generate any comparable plausibility for the contention 
that it is impossible to believe any abstract object, say, to be any other 
abstract object. Probably the reason is that because the relations among 
various abstract objects are as complicated as they are—far more compli­
cated than the relation of simple contrariety between equality and 
inequality—it does not offhand seem impossible to have one abstract object 
“ in mind” and not realize that it is distinct from another abstract object 
that stands in similar but different complicated relations to various other 
such objects. But of course much more would have to be said to get to 
the bottom of this issue. .
8. Let us now briefly consider the contrast between sensibles and Forms 
that emerges from Premise (A) along with the foregoing considerations 
about Premise (B).
At the end of sec. 4 above, we saw that the feature possessed by equality 
that it would not possess if it were sensible, according to Plato, is that of 
being incapable of appearing to be inequality. We have just seen that Plato 
must put some sort of restriction on the notion of equality’s “ appearing” 
thus-and-so if he is to be able to uphold this claim.
It is of course not to be denied that a sensible object can be designated 
in such a way as to imply that it possesses a certain property and could 
not consistently actually possess the contrary property. For example, one 
can designate “that pair of equal sticks over there,” and by that designation 
one implies that the pair of sticks is not at that time unequal. But the 
difference between sensibles and Forms to which Plato is pointing is this. 
It is impossible, he claims, for someone to “ have” equality “ in mind,” 
or have an “ appearance” of equality, and at the same time take it that 
equality is inequality. On the other hand it is not impossible, he holds, 
for someone to have equal sensibles in mind and take it that they are 
unequal, for the reason that equal sensibles are capable, though being equal 
at a particular time (cf. n. 10) of nevertheless appearing unequal at that 
same time. Indeed, equal sensibles are capable of appearing unequal even 
when one is aware explicitly that they are equal, because the knowledge 
of their equality is not capable of wiping away the sensory appearance of 
their inequality.35 In the particular respect at hand, that is, he holds that
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equal sensibles are capable of presenting misleading appearances in a way 
in which equality and inequality are not. Unlike sensibles, Forms are 
“cognitively reliable,” as Vlastos has put it (though I would disagree with 
his way of explaining the matter).36
A common modem reaction to Plato’s view, of course, is to contend 
that he has taken for a feature of equality something that is really only a 
feature of certain sentences, like “ Equality is inequality” , or of our ways 
of using such sentences, or of certain beliefs or other such states of the 
human mind, like the belief that equality is inequality. (This contention is 
compatible with the claim that there is such an object as equality, and with 
its denial.) I think—though I cannot defend the claim here—that Plato was 
led to his view by more than a mere failure to consider the alternatives, 
and that he had reasons for rejecting them.
A good deal of Plato’s metaphysical thinking goes into trying to explain 
this difference between Forms and sensibles. As'I understand his position, 
he takes the fact that sensibles exist in space and time to be what allows 
them to present contrary appearances to different perspectives. Forms, on 
the other hand, do not have a place within any “manifold” that allows 
different perspectives or anything of the kind. But the defense of this line 
of interpretation of the rest of Plato’s view lies far beyond the scope of 
the present paper, and his metaphysical explanation is certainly not pre­
sented or used in the argument at hand. Rather, that argument leaves the 
resistance of the Forms to this particular sort of error at the level of a 
commonsense observation, on which Plato might hope for agreement from 
the persons at whom the argument is aimed.
NOTES
1. I myself would include with it only the argument at Rep. 476-480.
2. J. L. Ackrill and David Gallop hold that the “ theory of Forms” is accepted by all parties 
in the Phaedo itself. See Ackrill, “Anamnesis in the P haedo,"  in Lee et a l., eds., 
Exegesis and Argument (Assen, 1973), pp. 177-195, esp. p. 191, and Gallop, Plato, 
Phaedo (Oxford, 1975), p. 97.
3. Gallop, p. 95, perhaps attributes something like this line of thought to Plato. I myself 
think that Plato did regard the general capacity to help solve certain philosophical 
difficulties as commending a belief in the Forms, but I do not think that he regarded 
that as sufficient by itself to establish that belief (it would not exclude alternative ways 
of solving those difficulties). Instead, I think he believed that a more direct argument 
was required, such as we find in the present passage.
4. Many have thought that Plato’s works are only fragmentary or inconclusive explorations 
of philosophical ideas, and some have misgivings about calling what he says about Forms 
a “ theory” (see e.g., Julia Annas, Introduction to Plato’s Republic [Oxford, 1981], p.
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217). 1 myself think that it is correct to speak of Plato’s dialogues as expounding a 
“ theory" in some reasonably substantive sense of that word, but here I use it in a very 
broad and loose way carrying very little freight.
5. The text is mildly problematic too, but I think that what Burnet prints is clearly right, 
and that attempts to make sense of the alternative reading are clearly unsuccessful: see 
the discussion by Gallop, p. 122, of Verdenius’ interpretation of the variant. I think that 
Gallop is also quite correct that the Greek will not bear the sense assigned it by his 
interpretation (c) of the usual text.
6. See N. R. Murphy, The Interpretation o fP la to ’s Republic (Oxford, 1951), p. I l l ,  n ., 
and G. E. L. Owen, "A Proof in the Peri Ideon ,"  Journal o f  Hellenic Studies (1957), 
Pt. 1, 103-111, reprinted in R. E. Allen, ed. Studies in P lato's Metaphysics (New York, 
1965), 293-312, esp. p. 306, n. 2. (This article will be cited here in the latter pagination.) 
See also K. W. Mills, “ Plato’s Phaedo 74b7-c6,” Phronesis 2 (1957), 128-148, and 3 
(1958) 40-58, and the discussion in David Gallop, pp. 121-125, as well as Alexander 
Nehamas, “ Plato on the Imperfection of the Sensible World,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 12 (1975), 105-117.
7. And although I must admit that I once accepted it myself, in my Plato on Knowledge 
and Reality (Indianapolis, 1976), pp. 66-67 with n. 16.
8. Gallop, pp. 122-123.
9. The strongest considerations in favor of the Murphy/Owen reading are developed by 
Owen’s arguments that Aristotle took Plato to believe such things, and argued against 
his theory of Forms partly on that score. See Owen, pp. 309-312.
10. 1 disagree with Bostock’s strategy, pp. 75-77, of trying to support the view that this is 
what Plato meant by adducing Rep. 479a-c. To present my full reason for disagreeing 
would require a discussion of that passage, for which I do not have space here. However, 
Plato’s use of the word “equal” ( ’Cctoi) at 74b8, with its plain implication that the sticks 
are equal, seems to me to make the present interpretation so much more natural than 
the other that one should accept the present interpretation if it allows—as I think 1 can 
show here that it does—clear sense to be made of Plato’s argument.
11. Nehamas maintains (p. I l l ,  n. 30), adducing Rep. 597-598 in support, that because 
Plato is drawing an ontological distinction, differences in appearance from different 
perspectives are unlikely to enter into the drawing of it. That seems to me a mistake. 
For Plato, one manifestation of the ontological distinction is precisely a difference 
between Forms and sensibles with regard to what appearances they are capable of 
presenting. See sec. 8.
12. Indeed, Nehamas (pp. 115-116) bases his defense of the Murphy/Owen interpretation 
(or something extremely like it) on the claim that it helps us understand Plato’s willingness 
to generalize the argument of 74b-c to other Forms. See sec. 4, end.
13. As Owen observes, pp. 309-312, Aristotle accuses Plato of introducing a “ nonrelative 
class of relatives,” in the sense of somehow nonrelational cases of relational predicates. 
Although I cannot here adequately expound the issue, I think that Aristotle's remarks 
do not involve the relations that Owen thinks they do.
14. A partial list of passages in which Plato deals with relations is given—alas, to little 
effect—at my op. cit., p. 79 (n. 16). See also E. Scheibe, “ Ueber Relativbegriffe in 
der Philosophie Platons,” Phronesis, 12 (1967), 28-49, and H.-N. Castaneda, Plato s 
Phaedo Theory of Relations,” Journal o f  Philosophical Logic, 1 (1972), 467-480. 
Though Castaneda’s interpretation has raised controversy, he shows at the very least 
that later passages of the Phaedo can be interpreted in such a way as to explain why 
Plato sometimes talks as though relational predicates are monadic, without attributing 
to him the view that a relation can hold of a single object without regard to any others.
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15. This objection seems to me crippling to the account of Plato’s theory of Forms that is 
advanced by Alexander Nehamas, op. c it., which is a version of the account developed 
by Owen (in line with the Murphy/Owen intepretation of this passage) and also, in a 
slightly different version, adopted by Gregory Vlastos, “ Degrees of Reality in Plato,” 
Renford Bambrough, ed., New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (New York, 1965), pp. 
1-19. For Nehamas’ account seems clearly to require that the Form of equal possess the 
property of equality “ completely” and “ in itself’ (p. 116), by which Nehamas evidently 
means “nonrelationally.” With this idea Nehamas seems to combine another one, that 
the Forms possess their properties essentially, not accidentally (ibid.). (For this idea see 
also Vlastos, op. c it., p. 17, “ All of [a Form’s] properties must stick to it with logical 
glue.” ) Nehamas seems to be relying tacitly on the idea that there is some sort of 
connection between possessing a property essentially and possessing it nonrelationally. 
Perhaps he takes this connection to lie in the often-alleged impossibility of a thing’s 
bearing an essential relation to some other thing (which is the denial of the traditional 
so-called Doctrine of Internal Relations). Unfortunately, he does not explain what he 
has in mind. In general, it seems plain that unless the connection is shown, essentiality 
is one thing and nonrelationality is quite another. It might be plausible to say that Plato 
took the Form of equal to be equal essentially, but this plausibility cannot be transferred 
to the idea that he took the Form of equal to be equal nonrelationally, as Nehamas’ line 
of thought here seems to require.
Independent of Nehamas’ positive account there are also objections that he raises to 
the sort of account offered here. To those objections I turn in sec. 4.
16. See W. D. Ross, P lato 's Theory o f  Ideas (Oxford, 1951), p. 23, and R. Hackforth, 
Plato’s Phaedo, (Cambridge, England, 1955), p. 69.
17. To such interpretations as this Nehamas objects (p. I l l )  that it requires the equal to be 
“ an impossible-object construction,” something that appears equal from all angles. Not 
so (to pass over the fact—cf. n. 15—that an equal not equal to anything is quite as 
impossible). Plato’s point is not that unlike sensibles, the equal appears equal from all 
angles. Rather it is that unlike sensibles, the equal does not appear unequal from any 
angles, because it doesn’t, so to speak, have any angles. See further sec. 8.
Nehamas seems to me clearly right, however, in rejecting the “ approximation inter­
pretation” of this passage, according to which only the Form of equal is exactly equal 
whereas sensible equals are only approximately equal. The approximation interpretation 
was also rejected by Owen, “ A Proof,” and Gregory Vlastos, “ Degrees.” See more 
recently Bostock, p. 73-74.
18. See Mills, p. 128; Gallop, p. 124-125; and Bostock, p. 83.
19. See for example Mills, p. 128; Gallop, p. 121; Mohan Matthen, “ Forms and Participants 
in Plato’s Phaedo,” Nous, 18 (1984), 281-297; and Bostock, pp. 83-85.
20. Bostock. p. 84.
21. I think myself that Plato usually allows “ contrary Forms,” in spite of the fact that they 
seem to raise difficulties for his theory, as Gallop points out (p. 125). See Vlastos, 
“ Degrees of Reality in Plato,” pp. 7-8.
22. The person claiming that equality and inequality are both sensible will presumably claim 
that they are different sensible objects, but it is hard to imagine what the difference 
between them will then be said to be. That one is on Fourth Avenue and the other on 
Fifth Avenue? I think, in fact (though I cannot pursue the matter here), that Plato has 
in mind an opponent who believes that neither equality nor inequality is “ a single thing,” 
but that each, so to speak, is “ many,” i.e., equality is the many equal sensibles and 
inequality is the many unequal sensibles (see e.g., Rep. 479a4-5). The idea is probably 
that, for example, equality can be taken, depending on the circumstances, as any given
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sensible instance of equality you like (comparison of this view with, say, Berkeley’s is 
suggestive).
23. Nehamas, op. c it., pp. 115-116.
24. Matthen, op. cit., advances an interpretation that, like Bluck’s earlier account (R. S. 
Bluck, “ Plato’s Form of Equal,” Phronesis, 4 [1959J, 5-11), finds in the argument not 
only Forms and sensibles but additional entities as well. Aside from points of detail 
(which I attempt to cover below), I think that both Matthen’s interpretations and Bluck's 
introduce far more complexity into the argument than the text justifies (for example, 
Matthen, p. 291, requires the introduction of a complicated, non-trivial “unspoken 
lemma” ). Plato presents his argument as a simple, brief, and straightforward one, not 
involving complicated background assumptions. It seems to me that that is how we ought 
to take it if we possibly can. (This does not, however, settle whether Plato elsewhere, 
as in Phaedo 102ff., introduces such entities as “ Form copies” into his metaphysics.)
25. See G. E. L. Owen, “ Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment of the Forms,” in G. E. 
L. Owen, ed., Aristotle on Dialectic (Oxford, 1963), pp. 103-125, esp. p. 114-115.
26. Gallop, pp. 123-124.
27. It is not clear that the same can be said of the argument for the same conclusion at Rep. 
476-480.
28. Many interpreters have denied that that passage, and in general those passages that hold 
that sensibles are copies of Forms, support a strictly self-predicationist interpretation. 
See for example R. E. Allen, “ Participation and Predication,” Allen, ed., op. cit. pp. 
43-60, esp. pp. 45-47. Gallop’s view on the present passage (pp. 92-93, 125) is that 
Plato had not yet distinguished the descriptive and designative roles of such phrases as 
“ the equal” . Perhaps not (as I once agreed, op. cit., pp. 64-65, 78 [n. 7], 86 [n. 54]). 
But M eno  73e-74b suggests otherwise (cf. Rep. 509a3). At any rate, my point here is 
that the present argument does not require for its cogency any implicit self-predicationist 
assumption, and our interpretation of the force of the argument itself should not incor­
porate one.
29. See e.g., Phdo. 109d-e, 11c; Rep. 515-516, 532b-c.
30. The recent discussion of this sort of matter goes back to Quine’s paper, “ Quantifiers 
and Prepositional Attitudes,” Journal o f  Philosophy, 53 (1956).
31. See, for example, Matthen, p. 285.
32. I add “ ways of thinking about an object” to allow for the possibility that an object may 
be introduced into a belief by some means other than a strictly linguistic designation. 
Though important in other connections, this qualification is unimportant here.
33. Note that there is a distinction at work after our argument between evvoeiv and 
emcTTaaSai, which is relevant to Plato’s views about recollection.
34. I take this to be the import of 195e-196a, esp. 195el-3, 196a2, though the matter is 
complex.
35. See, e.g., Rep. 602e and Soph. 235e-236a.
36. “ Degrees of Reality,” p. 7. The reason why I would disagree with his way of explaining
'  the matter is that he accepts something rather closer to the Murphy/Owen account of
Plato’s attitude to predicates like “ equal” than I would (cf. sec. 3).
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